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On January 16, 2020 the European Parliament passed a resolution about the state
of the Article 7(1) TEU hearings with Hungary and Poland, noting with concern
that “the reports and statements by the Commission and international bodies, such
as the UN, OSCE and the Council of Europe, indicate that the situation in both
Poland and Hungary has deteriorated since the triggering of Article 7(1) of the
TEU” (para. 3, emphasis added). The resolution is a plea for a structured and more
meaningful process in which each EU institution would exercise its existing powers
in a meaningful and cooperative manner. The resolution emphasizes that the Article
7(1) TEU preventive process is one of risk assessment and one that may have
actual – including budgetary – consequences (see esp. para. 6).
The resolution may of course be read as a desperate attempt by the newly elected
Parliament to still be included once the process reaches the Council (i.e. a thinly
veiled assertion of its institutional prerogatives). In addition to inter-institutional
tensions, it calls attention to how the Council is visibly left behind when events
are moving fast on the ground [this is why the resolution “calls on the Council
[…] to ensure that hearings under Article 7(1) of the TEU also address new
developments and assess risks of breaches”], while it also urges the Commission
“to make full use of the tools available to address a clear risk of a serious breach
by Poland and Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded, in particular
expedited infringement procedures and applications for interim measures before the
Court of Justice” (para. 3.)
Hungarian PM Orban responded robustly to the resolution: he called EPP MEPs
who voted to support the resolution “traitors” and mused aloud about the possibility
of Fidesz leaving the EPP. This line of thinking has been revealed in early January
2020 after Fidesz and PIS leadership met in Warsaw to discuss the future of Europe.
Thus, it is high time to reflect on the potential of closer Polish-Hungarian cooperation
on the state of the rule of law in Europe. The EP’s January 16, 2020 resolution
provides helpful pointers for this exercise.
The State of the Rule of Law Dialogue
The resolution confirms that the EU’s rule of law dialogue reached new lows in late
2019: the national governments at the center of the rule of law crisis took advantage
– again – of EU actors’ trepidation.
After the Commission’s attempt to reinvent its rule of law playbook in the summer
of 2019 (around the time of the EP elections), it was for Council to up its game
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on Article 7(1) TEU. Despite the Finnish Presidency’s commitment to reviving the
process, by September 2019 it was hard to get enthusiastic about the hearing
in the General Affairs Council (GAC). After all, all a GAC meeting has to offer
to the general public is a bland brief summary on the atmosphere of a meeting
in the official minutes. This was the case until a freedom of information request
by Professor Laurent Pech opened the doors of the GAC to all who still care about
the rule of law crisis. This unexpected transparency raised the stakes before the
December 2019 GAC meeting for the Hungarian government: it was time to show
off those skills at subverting the Article 7(1) TEU process to the general European
public.
And so it happened, that a month before the December 2019 GAC hearing, on
November 12, 2019 the Hungarian government tabled a 200-page long bill (T/8016)
to amend 76 acts of parliament in a new effort to rein in the judiciary. In terms of
its contents the bill, inter alia, meant to finally create those administrative courts
that the Hungarian government has been longing for (this time without a Supreme
Administrative Court or ministerial supervision). Observers may recall that in
December 2018 the Hungarian Parliament had adopted a law to install a separate
branch of administrative courts, nominally within the Hungarian judiciary, yet placed
under the direction of a separate, newly established Supreme Administrative Court
(Közigazgatási Fels#bíróság) alongside the existing Supreme Court (Kúria) (Act no.
CXXX of 2018). After sharp criticism from the Venice Commission and also from
various EU actors, in May 2019 the Government first suspended the implementation
of the new law, and then dropped it completely in the fall of 2019. The November
2019 bill was a new iteration of this old idea. And for good measure the new bill
expanded national security screening for the senior ranks of the judiciary.
The Hungarian Parliament adopted the bill on December 10, 2019, ie on the very
day the GAC hearing was meant to happen. Not all went to plan. Before it could
become law, the President of the Republic returned the bill to Parliament to enable
a few quick fixes that the Hungarian Parliament dutifully adopted on December 17,
2019. Note that this time around the Ministry of Justice did not turn to the Venice
Commission for an opinion in the spirit of European constitutional dialogue. This
may be because the whole point of the timing of the bill (a month before the GAC
meeting) was to ensure that it would thwart any meaningful exchange in and outside
the GAC on the state of the rule of law in Hungary on the political scene. Which self-
respecting European government would dare to ask pointed questions about the
reasons behind hyper-technical legal changes on numerous issues in the shadow of
a new, 200-page-long judiciary bill that is pending before a national parliament?
There was little time to ponder this question, however, as on December 12-13,
2019 all attention shifted to the new Polish bill on the judiciary, adopted in response
to the CJEU’s November 19, 2019 judgment. In that judgment, reached upon a
preliminary reference from Polish courts, the CJEU held that it was for the national
courts to assess the independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish
Supreme Court. Trusting national courts with an assessment of local conditions
under EU law is of course not new for the CJEU. But in this case it turned out to be
a fateful assignment, as the Polish government decided to attach new disciplinary
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consequences to any such attempt in the new bill. The bill was condemned by
the deans of 13 Polish law faculties. In addition, the bill was referred to the Venice
Commission by the speaker of the Polish Senate.
One is kept wondering what difference would it have made if the Commission had
brought this case itself, and with some expediency? And if the CJEU were to decide
on the issues raised without tossing the ball back to the national courts?
Rescue Attempts from the CoE? The Venice
Commission and the ECtHR
The Parliament’s new resolution emphasizes that the Article 7(1) TEU is a process
that is based on assessing risks, looking for a clear risk of a serious breach of
the EU’s founding values. The Parliament recalls that this process requires all EU
institutions to use their powers to the best of their abilities. Based on its own plans
and communications it is apparent that the Commission believes infringement action
to be a tool in its toolkit to safeguard the rule of law. And while formally Article 7(1)
TEU has nothing to do with a case on preliminary references before the CJEU, the
consequences of a judgment in a matter that is at the heart of the crisis (politically
tainted disciplinary measures against Polish judges) – somewhat predictably – fall
within the series of events routinely described as the EU’s rule of law crisis.
A decade into the events, risk assessment under Article 7(1) TEU can drawn on a
impressive body of evidence, collected and interpreted by constitutional actors inside
and outside the EU. Two more pieces were added to this puzzle in less than a week,
in a manner that appears to take into account the facts before these CoE institutions
as well as the broader context of the cases before them.
Consider the Venice Commission’s urgent opinion on the latest Polish bill. E.g. para.
31:
“Several provisions of the Amendments eliminate the competence of
the Polish courts to examine whether another court decision was issued
by a person appointed as a judge in compliance with the Constitution,
European law and other international legal standards. These amendments
are seemingly designed to have a nullifying effect on the CJEU ruling of 19
November 2019 and the Supreme Court judgment of 5 December 2019,
and on other pending proceedings where the competence of the newly
appointed judges has been challenged.” (emphasis added)
This is then followed by the following observation in para. 37:
“the above provisions, taken together, aim at nullifying the effects of the
CJEU ruling. This is a serious challenge to the principle of the primacy of
EU law. In the preliminary ruling of 19 November 2019, the CJEU clearly
held that it was a duty of the referring court to examine the question of
independence of the Disciplinary Chamber, in particular by looking at the
composition of the selecting body (the NCJ). Polish courts dealing with the
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consequences of the CJEU judgment of 19 November 2019 or confronted
with an issue of judicial independence in a different context, will be put in an
impossible position of choosing between following the requirements of the
EU law as interpreted by the CJEU, or using legal avenues provided by the
TFEU, and abiding by the new law.” (emphasis added)
In brief, the Venice Commission was willing to consider the recent Polish bill in its
broader context and considered the impact of this regulation on Polish courts as well
as on the European legal order. The language is certainly tentative at times. What
matters for the purposes of risk analysis (ie the exercise in Article 7(1) TEU) is that
that these particular provisions are read in a broader context where legal tools of this
kind are routinely used to undermine the rule of law in the very member state.
As a second example, take a recent judgment of the Grande Chamber of the ECtHR
in Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt v. Hungary (January, 20, 2019). The case involved
a challenge against a fine that was imposed on the Hungarian Party of the Dog
with Two Tails for encouraging voters to use an app to share anonymously with
each other photos of invalid ballots cast in a 2016 referendum in Hungary. The
question in the referendum posed by the Hungarian government: “Do you want the
European Union to be entitled to order the mandatory settlement of non-Hungarian
citizens in Hungary without Parliament’s consent?” The government’s preferred
response was “no.” Despite 3.362.224 voting “no” (ie. over 98 % of the respondents),
the referendum was invalid as participation did not reach a 50 % threshold. The
Party of the Dog with Two Tails encouraged its voters to cast invalid ballots in the
referendum. It was fined for endangering the fairness of the election for exercising its
rights against their purpose.
Hungarian courts did not believe that this case involved freedom of expression.
The Grand Chamber of the ECtHR found that it did, and concluded that using
an unforseeable limitation on freedom of expression violates Article 10(2) of the
Convention. Importantly, the ECtHR found that this was about the integrity of
democratic institutions and the rule of law:
• 100.  When those legal provisions form the basis for restricting the exercise of
freedom of expression, this is an additional element to be taken into account
when considering the foreseeability requirements which the law must fulfil. In
this connection the Court reiterates that free speech is essential in ensuring “the
free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature”. …
• 101.  In the Court’s opinion, this kind of supervision naturally extends to the
assessment of whether the legal basis relied on by the authorities in restricting
the freedom of expression of a political party was foreseeable in its effects to an
extent ruling out any arbitrariness in its application. A rigorous supervision here
not only serves to protect democratic political parties from arbitrary interferences
by the authorities, but also protects democracy itself, since any restriction on
freedom of expression in this context without sufficiently foreseeable regulations
can harm open political debate, the legitimacy of the voting process and its
results and, ultimately, the confidence of citizens in the integrity of democratic
institutions and their commitment to the rule of law (emphasis added).
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The ECtHR did what we had seen from the Venice Commission: placed the facts
of the case before it (i.e. a political prank by a joke party) into its broader context
of regular restrictions of political dissent and the rights of political parties in a
member state that is eager to use the law to build an illiberal democracy. The above
statement may not make that much of a difference for the outcome of this case,
but it reminds all about the foundations of the European human rights regime and
the interconnections between these founding elements. These are the very same
foundations that the risk assessment exercise of Article 7(1) TEU aims to protect.
What is Next?
As of January 2020 the Hungarian government, and PM Orban personally has
been attacking courts, human rights defenders and the legal profession. His radio
interview of January 17, 2020 responding to the European Parliament’s resolution
attacked not only the “traitors” of the EPP that supported the resolution, and George
Soros, but the Hungarian court that awarded damages for racial segregation in
a local school. As a by-the-by it also targeted those who assisted detainees in
seeking compensation under the 2016 Hungarian law on compensation for inhuman
detention conditions, a law adopted to implement an ECtHR pilot judgment against
Hungary. The radio interview followed similar speeches along similar lines. A week
earlier PM Orban said that the judgment awarding compensation for desegregation
“hurts society’s  ‘sense of justice’ as the people of Gyöngyöspata see that the town’s
Roma community gets a ‘significant sum without having to work for it in any way’.”
Attacks of this kind against courts and the legal profession are already familiar in the
Polish political discourse. This is a new development in Hungary, though few will be
surprised in light of more intense recent cooperation between the political elites of
these already friendly countries.
The real question is what various EU actors wish to do in the face of such a blatant
attack against the rule of law — beyond continuing the Article 7(1) TEU dialogue as
if nothing has happened. The Parliament’s resolution is asking for more: it is asking
for actual risk assessment that is context savvy, instead of focusing of past events
and it is asking for responses from the EU that reflect the stakes, including budgetary
conditions and consequences. Hardly a slow start for a new year!
This article has previously been posted on the Bridge Network’s website and is re-
posted here with kind permission.
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